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Abstract 
 
We assess the effects of terrorism on capital flight in a panel of 29 African countries for 
which data is available for the period 1987-2008. The terrorism dynamics entail domestic, 
transnational, unclear and total terrorisms. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations and Quantile regressions 
(QR). The following findings are established. First, for GMM, domestic, unclear and total 
terrorisms consistently increase capital flight, with the magnitude relative higher from unclear 
terrorism. Second, for QR: (i) the effect of transnational terrorism is now positively 
significant in the top quantiles (0.75
th
 and 0.90
th
) of the capital flight distribution, (ii) 
domestic and total terrorisms are also significant in the top quantiles and (iii) unclear 
terrorism is significant in the 0.10
th
 and 0.75
th
 quantiles.  Policy implications are discussed.  
 
JEL Classification: C50; D74 ;  F23; N40 ; O55 
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1. Introduction 
Terrorism is the new face of violence with economic consequences. In the context of a 
paradoxical African setting, where countries in this region are in need of scarce economic 
resources to foster their development process, and also records almost the highest volume of 
global capital flight among developing countries, we take interest in understanding its linkage 
to terrorism. As a foundational definition; capital flight is the outflow of economic resources 
from respective countries (Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 2014; Asongu, 2014). It includes 
the outflows of short-term capital as a response to some factors that are peculiar with the 
respective country, and which may affect the economic value of such capital. Concisely, we 
ask two important questions: first, what magnitude of the capital flight from Africa can be 
explained by terrorists’ activities? Second, how different is this magnitude when comparing 
terrorism initiated by the nationals of the respective countries (domestic terrorism) and those 
initiated across borders or by nationals of other countries (transnational terrorism)?  
 
The answer to the first question has important implications to provide relevant empirical 
evidence on the cost of the rising terrorism in resource starved Africa. Most importantly, by 
providing relevant statistics on the magnitude of influence of terrorism on capital flight, the 
reality of the cost of terrorism can be better seen and may spur policy actions. Most countries 
in Africa are taking steps towards attracting and retaining capital, although part of the effort 
is to improve security and reduce the risk of investment within the country, however, a new 
generation of policy may be motivated if the economic value (in terms of capital flight) of a 
terrorist action is clearly known. The answer to the second question may suggest the relative 
impact of the two forms of terrorism, and afterwards the direction of policy efforts can be 
exploited towards tackling the one with higher economic impact. This is important 
considering that there is a rising campaign for development partners to increase aid flow to 
African countries (as well as other development countries) in order to augment the resources 
needed for counter-terrorism efforts (see Bandyopadhyay et al, 2014; Efobi et al, 2015; 
Asongu et al, 2015).  
 
Empirical studies on the drivers of capital flight can be broadly categorised into two groups: 
the domestic and external determinants. The domestic drivers include those conditions that 
are prevalent within the country, which explains the reasons for capital flight. They include 
the structural features of the economy (in terms of the country being natural resource 
dependence or otherwise), macroeconomic environment (e.g. economic growth and 
inflation), risk and returns on investment (e.g. currency depreciation, financial instability, 
domestic tax rate), the governance structure of the country (such as corruption), and other 
forms of political factors. Focusing on the political factors, authors have identified the 
political environment of countries as having a significant influence on capital flight (Collier 
et al., 2004; Davies, 2008; Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 2014). Political instability such as 
war or civil unrest raises the insurance premium on investment, as well as the risk of loss or 
damages to assets. This causes investment capitals to be taken out of the country to countries 
where the risks of losing such investment are lower.  
 
Terrorism involves the use of violence by individuals or groups against non-combatants in 
order to foster political or social objectives, and with the intimidation of a larger audience 
beyond the immediate victims (Bandyopadhyay et al, 2014). Unlike political instability, 
terrorists are involved in pressuring besieged government to concede to their demands by 
targeting civilians. Since the occurrences of terrorist actions are non-deterministic and may 
not be accurately predicted; hence, it raises the risk and cost of retaining capital in the venue 
country. In most cases, terrorist target central economic locations; with poor anti-terrorism 
efforts by the government, target countries will witness an increasing outflow of capital due 
to heightened uncertainties/capital security. On this note, it is important to also consider the 
distinct impact of the two main forms of terrorism (i.e. domestic and transnational). This is 
because there are rising incidences of African countries experiencing spill-over from terrorist 
activities in neighbouring countries. The Somali’s Al-Shabaab activities in Kenya and some 
other East African countries; and the Nigeria’s Boko Haram group perpetrating violence in 
neighbouring country Cameroon, Niger and Chad, are cases in point.  
 
The contrasting effect of domestic and transnational terrorism have spurred research interest 
that is targeted at understanding its impact on capital movement. The earliest work to carry 
on this enquiry, especially for developing countries, are Bandyopadhyay and Younas (2014), 
and Bandyopadhyay et al, (2014, 2015). The authors studied the effect of both domestic and 
transnational terrorism on movement of foreign investments; they found similar negative 
impact but at different magnitudes. In the spirit of the debate, we provide the first empirical 
work on the linkage between terrorism (and its components) and capital flight using an 
isolated sample of 29 African countries. This sample is unique because of the controversial 
regimes of capital outflow it records. Interested readers can see Ndikumana, Boyce and 
Ndiaye (2014) for a more detailed statistics of the trend of capital flight from Africa. 
However, we make attempt to highlight some: as at the period 1970-90, capital flight from 
Africa was about 40 percent of the entire private wealth, which was about four times that of 
Latin America despite the higher private capital per worker of the later. Also, in 2010, 
unrecorded capital flight from Africa represents 39.5 percent of GDP, compared to 12 percent 
in the East and South Asia. The implication of this statistics are: first, the region faces a lot of 
capital constraint compared to other regions and a capital flight of this magnitude will imply 
that the available resources required for development will be further depleted. No wonder the 
huge resource gap recorded in the region (see Asiedu, 2006). Second, as a result of this 
impoverishment, the damaging effect on human development structures will be further visible 
as funds needed for social services such as education and health care, among others, will be 
lacking (see Ndikumana and Boyce, 2011). As a result of these, urgent attention is needed to 
understand other possible and emerging causes of capital flight as a further step towards 
resolving it. 
 
This paper is connected to the literature on the determinants of capital flight on one hand, and 
the economic consequences of the rising rate of global terrorism, on the other hand. The first 
strand of literature have not considered the dynamic influence of terrorism on capital flight. 
The second strand of literature is becoming popular following the rising trend of terrorist 
attacks around the world. More importantly, attention is being drawn to understand the 
consequences as this will help to shape global policy on acts of terrorism. The contributors to 
this literature, and their focus has being: terrorism and its consequences on foreign 
investment (Bandyopadhyay and Younas, 2014; Bandyopadhyay et al, 2014, 2015; Asongu et 
al, 2015; Efobi et al, 2015); terrorism and the labour force (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2014a); 
terrorism and economic development (Piazza, 2006); terrorism and the productivity of certain 
sectors in the country (Berrebi and Klor, 2010; Berrebi and Ostwald, 2013); terrorism and 
fertility rate (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2014b). This study is the first to relate these two strands of 
literature by using a sample from the African region for the period 1987 to 2008 as well as a 
variety of macroeconomic controls. We implement a robust panel analysis to understand the 
effects of terrorism on capital flight as well as observe the dynamic implications across the 
different origins of terrorism (i.e. transnational, domestic). We find that terrorism as a whole 
causes an increase in capital flight in Africa. However, when considering the disaggregated 
terrorism data, domestic terrorism significantly causes capital flight unlike transnational 
terrorism. Even unclear terrorism was also found to have a significant impact on capital 
flight. The effect of the different forms of terrorism on capital flight (considering varying 
quantiles) was further computed. This is such that the effect is considered at different 
intensities of terrorism. The result suggest that at 75 percent quantile, both domestic and 
transnational significantly explains the extent of capital flight from African countries. As for 
the unclear terrorism and total terrorism, the impact on capital flight was significant across 
the levels of percentiles apart from 25 and 90 percent quantiles (unclear terrorism), and 10 
percent quantile for total terrorism.  
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows: the second section lays out the empirical 
model, describes the variables and discuss the data. The econometric methodology was 
introduced and elaborated on in the third section, while the estimation results are presented 
and discussed in the fourth section. The fifth section concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
In this section, we present theoretical reasoning showing how the rising wave of terrorism 
will further impact on the incidences of capital flights. The theoretical explanations in this 
section does not suggest that anti-terrorism measures are sufficient or relevant for the 
reduction of the rising capital flight in Africa, as this provides insight to further studies that 
can be taken up in the future. 
 
The linkage between terrorism and capital flight is understood from the theoretical 
framework that explains how violence affects the movement of capital from a country. 
Collier (1999) presents a clear theoretical framework using civil war as a measure of 
violence, and its economic impact on respective countries. One of the main feature of 
Collier’s theory is that the capital stock of countries tend to reduce as a result of incidences of 
civil war. Conflict increases the rate of uncertainty with respect to the future returns on assets 
held within the country. As a result of this, domestic investors relocate their capital abroad. 
This is termed portfolio substitutions. Some studies that support this proposition include Le 
and Zak (2001), Ndikumana and Boyce (2002), and Davies (2010).  
 
To properly situate this theoretical framework, it is important to discuss how terrorism differ 
from other forms of violence like war, domestic conflicts and instabilities. Terrorism and 
other forms of violence are similar in terms of their resultant effects. Which are mostly loss 
of life and property. However, a clear distinction between them can be seen in their targets. 
For terrorism, the targets are often non-combatant individuals (see Bandyopadhyay, Sandler 
and Younas, 2014), who may be unaware of the ideologies or the objectives of the terrorists. 
Terrorists aim at non-combatants in order to raise their anxiety levels so that they pressure 
their government to grant the terrorist’s demands (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2010). This 
explains the reasons for a unified global effort targeted against terrorist activities: its effect 
adversely impacts innocent non-combatants. On the other-hand, the targets of other forms of 
violence are mostly combatants or government forces, and to a large extent, the violence is 
spurred by one party being disgruntled or having a deep feeling of being cheated (see Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2002; Sharma, 2006; Sandlers and Emders, 2008; Bellows and Miguel, 2009; 
Fearon and Laitin, 2011).  
 
Terrorism can be categorised into two main groups: domestic and transnational terrorism. 
Domestic terrorism is home grown and home directed and the perpetrators, victims, and 
audience are from the venue country. This is unlike transnational terrorism with perpetrators, 
supporters, victims, and audience involving two or more countries (Bandyopahyay, Sandler 
and Younas, 2011). There are varying impact of these two forms of terrorism on the domestic 
capital stocks of countries. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011) examines this effect on the income 
per capita of African countries for the period 1970-2007. For the entire sample, they found a 
transnational terrorism as having a significant impact on income per capita: the absence of a 
domestic terrorism impact was also observed. One identified reason for the differences in the 
impact of the two forms of terrorism is that transnational terrorism targets foreign citizens, 
foreign businesses (including personnel and assets), as well as international institutions. This 
will have a significant effect on capital retention in the country (Sandler and Enders, 2008).  
 
Banyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas (2014) is another closely related study, but with 
emphasis on a broader sample of 72 developing countries, and focusing on counterterrorism 
effect of foreign aid. The authors found the both types of terrorism having a depressing effect 
on foreign investment. Their intuition is: terrorist activities tend to increase the premium on 
retaining investment in the venue country, and heightens the risk capital and output losses, 
and other overhead cost like security. As a result of this, investment capital tend to be 
repatriated from countries that are prone to terrorist activities. As a comment on the issue of 
violence and capital repatriation, Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye (2014) supports this finding 
but with a focus on other violent activities apart from terrorism.  
 
What interest us here is how we can apply the portfolio substitutions theory of collier (1999) 
to explain the relationship being modelled in this study. We expect a positive relationship 
between terrorism and capital flight, however when considering the components of terrorism 
(i.e. domestic and transnational terrorism), we will rely on some theoretical explanations. For 
instance, transnational terrorism targets foreign citizens, foreign businesses and international 
institutions that are operational within the country, therefore it is expected that its impact will 
stimulate more capital repatriation from the affected country compared to domestic terrorism. 
The studies (i.e. Sandler and Enders, 2008; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2011) that reached this 
conclusion was focusing on a different form of capital – foreign investment – unlike the 
interest of this study. The mechanism is that: since terrorism affect the economic value of 
capital, capital owners will tend to substitute the location of their capital from the respective 
country to another location abroad (see Collier, 1999). We are cautious to say that this 
theoretical explanation applies for only transnational terrorism, especially since we are 
considering capital flight and not foreign investment, like other studies have focused on. 
Better clarity will be reached from our empirical analysis.      
 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data  
The terrorism data are from Efobi et al. (2015) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014). The capital 
flight data is from Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a). The matching process yields a panel of 29 
African countries for the period 1987-2008
1
, consisting of three year non-overlapping 
intervals. The dependent variable is capital flight, whereas the independent variables are 
dynamics of terrorisms, namely: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms, with 
the last measurement being the sum of the first-three. The interest of using a plethora of 
terrorism indicators is to avail more room for policy implications. Following the empirical 
literature on capital flight, we apply the direct definition of capital flight as defined by Boyce 
& Ndikumana (2012ab) as those unrecorded capital flows between a country and the rest of 
the world, whose measurement begins from the inflows of foreign exchange that are recorded 
in the country’s Balance of Payments (BoP), in which ‘missing money’ – the difference 
between recorded inflows and recorded outflows – is reported as ‘net errors and omissions. 
This measure has gained credence in most studies that have examined capital flight from 
different empirical  
 
It is important to devote some space to discuss the different dimensions of capital flight as 
contained in the empirical literature. It includes the direct ‘hot money’ measure of capital 
flight and the indirect ‘residual’ measure. The direct measure involves the computation of 
                                                          
1
 The adopted countries include: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leon, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
 
 
 
capital flight from the official balance of payment (BOP) data. It is the outflow of short-term 
capitalfrom respective countries to abroad in response to the prevailing determinants as 
identified in the literature. As such, it is measured as the summation of the net errors and 
omissions in the BOP and other short term capitals (see Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 
2014). The indirect approach computes capital flight as the difference between the recorded 
inflows and the recorded uses of the foreign exchange.  
 
The control variables include: corruption-control, fuel exports, trade openness and exchange 
rate. These have been substantially documented in the African capital flight literature (Boyce 
& Ndikumana, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2008, 2011, 2012ab; Asongu, 2013a, 2014a, 2015; Weeks, 
2012). First, capital flight has been documented to increase with poor institutional quality, 
notably: the absence of corruption-control (Weeks, 2012). The expected sign of this 
governance indicator depends on whether the distribution of corruption-control is positively 
or negatively skewed. This is consistent with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) who have 
based their study on bad governance because the governance indicators employed were 
negatively skewed for the most part. Second, according to Boyce and Ndikumana (2003, 
2012b), fuel-exporting countries are generally associated with higher levels of capital flight. 
Third, in accordance with Asongu (2013a), trade globalization is a natural determinant of 
capital flight, especially with practices like transfer pricing (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2008, 
2011; Asongu, 2015).  Fourth, very high deterioration of exchange rate increases capital 
flight (Asongu, 2014; Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003) because it betrays a negative economic 
outlook. Accordingly, investors prefer investment strategies that are less economically 
ambiguous (Le Roux & Kelsey, 2015ab). The definitions of the variables are provided in 
Table 1 below.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Definition and source of variables 
    
Variables Signs Definitions Sources 
    
Capital Flight   capf Logarithm of real capital flight (million, constant USD) Boyce & 
Ndikumana 
(2012a)  
 
WDI (World 
Bank) 
 
 
 
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014) 
 
   
Corruption-control CC “Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests”. 
   
Fuel Export  F_Exp Fuel Export (as a % of Merchandise Export) 
   
Exchange rate logxrate  Logarithm Exchange rate (local currency per USD) 
   
Trade Openness  tradeg Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) 
   
Domestic terrorism incd Number of Domestic terrorism incidents 
   
Transnational 
terrorism 
inct Number of Transnational terrorism incidents 
 
   
Unclear terrorism  incu Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear 
   
Total terrorism  incdtu Total number of terrorism incidents (inct + incu + 
incdtu) 
   
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WDI: World Development Indicators.   
 
 The summary statistics of the variables is presented in Table 2. Some of the indicators 
are presented in logarithms to enable comparisons in terms of means. We also notice that 
there is a substantial degree variation in the variables, implying that we can be confident that 
significant estimated relationships would emerge. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
      
 Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Obs 
      
Capital Flight (log) 2.843 0.696 -0.221 4.473 171 
      
Corruption-Control  -0.394 0.544 -2.061 1.128 232 
      
Fuel Export  16.745 30.695 0.000 97.896 232 
      
Exchange rate (log) 1.341 2.066 -9.607 9.349 232 
      
Trade Openness 62.979 26.764 12.420 155.957 230 
      
Domestic terrorism 5.344 19.135 0.000 153 232 
      
Transnational terrorism 0.892 2.223 0.000 23.333 232 
      
Unclear terrorism 1.022 5.571 0.000 67.666 232 
      
Total terrorism 7.260 24.578 0.000 180.333 232 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations. 
 
Table 3 below presents the summary statistics of the variables. Its purpose is to mitigate 
potential issues of multicollinearity. We observe that such issues are apparent among 
terrorism variables which display relatively higher degrees of substitution. We address these 
issues by using distinct specifications for each terrorism variable.  
 Table 3: Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size=170) 
          
Control Variables Independent Variables (Terrorism Dynamics) Dep. Vble  
CC F_Exp logxrate tradeg incd inct incu incdtu capf  
1.000 -0.157 -0.316 -0.219 0.029 -0.057 0.039 0.026 0.064 CC 
 1.000 -0.001 0.105 0.243 0.330 0.090 0.239 0.423 F_Exp 
  1.000 0.062 -0.087 -0.085 -0.032 -0.082 -0.170 logxrate 
   1.000 -0.085 -0.044 -0.108 -0.094 0.082 tradeg 
    1.000 0.540 0.717 0.986 0.256 incd 
     1.000 0.286 0.574 0.229 inct 
      1.000 0.809 0.183 incu 
       1.000 0.261 incdtu 
        1.000 capf 
          
Dep. Vble: Dependent Variable. CC: Corruption-Control. F_Exp: Fuel Exports. logxrate: exchange rate. tradeg: trade openness. incd: 
domestic terrorism. inct: transnational terrorism.  incu: unclear terrorism. Incdtu: total terrorism. capf: capital flight.   
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
In accordance with recent terrorism (Efobi et al., 2015) and capital flight (Asongu, 2014a) 
literature, we adopt a two-step GMM with forward orthogonal deviations instead of 
differencing as an empirical strategy. This technique is an extension of Arellano and Bover 
(1995) by Roodman (2009ab) and has the advantage of accounting for cross-sectional 
dependence and restricting the proliferation of instruments (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 
2008).  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation 
procedure.  
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Where: tiCF ,  
is capital flight in country i
 
at period t ; is a constant;
 
 represents tau ;  T , 
entails terrorism dynamics (domestic, transitional, unclear and total) ;
 
W  is the vector of 
control variables  (corruption-control, trade openness, exchange rate and fuel exports),
 i

 
is 
the country-specific effect, t  
is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. In the 
specification, we prefer the two-step to the one-step procedure because it is 
heteroscedasticity-consistent. 
 
3.2.2 Quantile Regressions  
Consistent  with the literature on conditional effects (Asongu et al., 2015), in order to 
investigate if existing levels of capital flight affect the impact of terrorism on capital flight, 
we employ a quantile regression (QR) approach. It consists of assessing the impact of 
terrorism throughout the conditional distributions of capital flight (Keonker & Hallock, 
2001). 
Contrary to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) that is based on the assumption of normally 
distributed error terms, the QR technique is not based on the hypothesis that capital flight and 
error terms are normally distributed. Accordingly, the QR approach enables us to investigate 
the effect of terrorism with particular emphasis on low- medium- and high-‘capital flight’ 
countries. The interest of the technique is based on the intuition that blanket policies from the 
terrorism-‘capital flight’ nexus may not be efficient, unless they are contingent on initial 
capital flight levels and tailored differently across low- medium- and high-‘capital flight’ 
countries. In essence, with QR, parameters are estimated at multiple points of the conditional 
distributions of capital flight (Keonker & Hallock, 2001). This technique is increasingly 
being employed in development literature, notably in: finance (Asongu, 2014b), corruption 
(Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013b; Efobi et al., 2014) and 
health (Asongu, 2014c) studies.  
The  th quantile estimator of terrorism is obtained by solving for the following optimization 
problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq. (3) for ease of presentation.   
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Where  1,0 . Contrary to OLS that is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, we minimise the weighted sum of absolute deviations. For 
instance the 10
th
 or 90
th 
quantiles (with  =0.10 or 0.90 respectively) by approximately 
weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of capital flight or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (4) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are examined only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of capital flight. For the model in Eq. (4) the dependent 
variable iy  is the capital flight indicator while ix  contains a constant term, corruption-
control, trade openness, exchange rate and fuel exports. The specifications in Eq. (3) are 
tailored to avoid the multicollinearity issues between terrorism variables identified in Table 3. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Presentation of results 
Table 4 and Table 5 present results corresponding to GMM and QR estimations. We engage 
them chronologically. Table 4 is presented in four main sets of specifications, notably for: 
domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism. Each set of specification entails three 
main regressions with incremental control variables. From Efobi et al. (2015), five main 
information criteria or post-estimation diagnostics are employed to assess the validity of 
models. First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test 
(AR2) in difference should not be rejected because its null hypothesis is the position for the 
absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. Second, the null hypothesis of the Sargan and 
Hansen tests for over-identification should also not be rejected because their null hypotheses 
are the positions that the instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. It should 
be noted that while the Sargan over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test is not robust and not 
weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR test is robust and weakened by instruments. Third, 
the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments is further employed to 
confirm the validity of the Hansen OIR results. Fourth, the Fisher test for joint validity of 
estimated coefficients is also provided. Its null hypothesis is the position that the joint 
estimated coefficients are not valid; hence should be rejected.  Fifth, we ensure that the rule 
of thumb for restricting over-identification or mitigating the proliferation of instruments is 
respected with the number of cross-sections higher than the number of instruments.  Based on 
highlighted the information criteria: (i) all models are valid at the 1% and 5% significance 
levels and (ii) five of the twelve models are valid if the 10% significance level is 
incorporated.   
We consider the former (1% and 5% levels) in establishing the following findings. First, 
domestic, unclear and total terrorisms consistently increase capital flight, with the magnitude 
relatively higher from unclear terrorism. Second, most of the significant control variables 
have the expected signs, notably: (i) corruption-control that is negatively skewed  increases 
capital flight; (ii) trade globalisation is positive related with capital flight and (iii) the sign of 
exchange rate is indeterminate while that of ‘fuel exports’ is unexpected. Fortunately, the 
signs of fuel exports are consistently positive in the QR findings.  
 
Table 4: Capital Flight and Terrorism (GMM) 
 Dependent Variable: Capital Flight (Log) 
             
 Domestic Terrorism  Transnational Terrorism Unclear Terrorism  Total Terrorism  
             
Capital Flight (log)(-1) 0.275*** 0.276*** 0.290*** 0.006 0.094 0.080 1.506*** 1.556*** 0.475*** 0.288** 0.350*** 1.414*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.952) (0.271) (0.348) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 1.992*** 1.820*** 1.704*** 2.919*** 2.495*** 2.377*** 0.313*** 0.344*** 1.167*** 1.680*** 1.625*** 0.400*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Domestic Terrorism  0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)          
Transnational Terrorism  --- --- --- -0.006 -0.004 0.006 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.625) (0.684) (0.595)       
Unclear Terrorism   --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.015*** --- --- --- 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Total Terrorism --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
          (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Corruption-Control  0.404*** 0.370*** 0.385*** 0.245** 0.309*** 0.238*** 0.509*** 0.532*** 0.518*** 0.441*** 0.432*** 0.447*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade Openness 0.004 0.001 0.004** 0.001 -0.00002 0.002 0.005* 0.002 0.006*** 0.004 0.001 0.004*** 
 (0.201) (0.377) (0.016) (0.428) (0.988) (0.170) (0.078) (0.199) (0.000) (0.190) (0.454) (0.008) 
Exchange rate(log) --- -0.001 0.010 --- 0.018 0.022* --- -0.027* -0.011 --- -0.007 0.002 
  (0.884) (0.412)  (0.253) (0.063)  (0.074) (0.377)  (0.568) (0.844) 
Fuel Exports --- --- -0.0009 --- --- 0.001 --- --- -
0.004*** 
--- --- -0.002* 
   (0.434)   (0.492)   (0.001)   (0.053) 
AR(1) (0.014) (0.010) (0.020) (0.048) (0.010) (0.027) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) 
AR(2) (0.096) (0.092) (0.110) (0.236) (0.162) (0.185) (0.085) (0.065) (0.060) (0.100) (0.081) (0.080) 
Sargan OIR (0.058) (0.113) (0.098) (0.391) (0.351) (0.336) (0.638) (0.404) (0.407) (0.087) (0.109) (0.120) 
Hansen OIR (0.406) (0.447) (0.272) (0.819) (0.666) (0.480) (0.722) (0.564) (0.288) (0.484) (0.413) (0.282) 
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.381) (0.522) (0.493) (0.459) (0.601) (0.226) (0.545) (0.651) (0.326) (0.371) (0.516) (0.446) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.391) (0.368) (0.204) (0.849) (0.576) (0.651) (0.672) (0.429) (0.304) (0.497) (0.335) (0.233) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.076) (0.246) (0.138) (0.731) (0.512) (0.250) (0.668) (0.804) (0.341) (0.231) (0.459) (0.191) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.924) (0.688) (0.662) (0.686) (0.663) (0.801) (0.588) (0.255) (0.284) (0.689) (0.346) (0.526) 
Fisher  17.52*** 65.45*** 44.55*** 6.60*** 22.90*** 11.67*** 26.79*** 131.1*** 681.5*** 6.77*** 47.30*** 70.27*** 
Instruments  21 25 29 21 25 29 21 25 29 21 25 29 
Countries  28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Observations  118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR (1) and 
AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
 
Table 5 on QR is presented in two main panels, notably Panel A on domestic and 
transnational terrorisms and Panel B on unclear and total terrorisms. We notice that the OLS 
findings are consistently different from the QR estimations, which justifies the choice of the 
estimation technique. It is interesting to note that the findings of Table 4 are based on mean 
effects of the dependent variable while those of Table 5 are based on conditional quantiles of 
the dependent variables. The following can be established for Table 5 with 1% and 5% 
significance levels. First, contrary to Table 4, the effect of transnational terrorism is now 
significant in the top quantiles (0.75
th
 and 0.90
th
) of the capital flight distribution.  Second, 
domestic terrorism is also significant in the top quantiles. Third, unclear terrorism is 
significant in the 0.10
th
 and 0.75
th
 quantiles. Fourth, the effect of total terrorism is also 
significant in top quantiles. Fifth, the significant control variable (or ‘fuel exports’) has the 
expected sign.  
 
Table 5: Capital Flight and Terrorism (Quantile regression) 
             
 Dependent Variable: Capital Flight (log) 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
 Domestic Terrorism Transnational Terrorism  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 2.620*** 1.989*** 2.394*** 2.688*** 3.009*** 3.151*** 2.638*** 1.942*** 2.428*** 2.730*** 3.019*** 3.285*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Terrorism  0.005*** 0.007 0.006 0.003* 0.006** 0.005*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.007) (0.20) (0.128) (0.091) (0.015) (0.004)       
Transnational Terrorism  --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.026 -0.020 0.030 0.013 0.041** 0.037** 
       (0.160) (0.613) (0.333) (0.454) (0.031) (0.049) 
Corruption-Control  0.126 0.093 0.176 0.145 0.085 0.139 0.138 0.075 0.094 0.171 0.113 0.136 
 (0.150) (0.715) (0.322) (0.229) (0.485) (0..379) (0.117) (0.751) (0.581) (0.125) (0.364) (0.280) 
Trade Openness 0.002 0.0003 -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.0008 0.002 0.002 
 (0.238) (0.953) (0.999) (0.451) (0.285) (0.158) (0.286) (0.829) (0.692) (0.679) (0.336) (0.383) 
Exchange rate(log) -0.041** -0.045 -0.061 -0.036 -0.036 -0.003 -0.042** -0.056 -0.043 -0.032 -0.025 -0.002 
 (0.030) (0.539) (0.164) (0.206) (0.088) (0.854) (0.025) (0.229) (0.330) (0.215) (0.247) (0.874) 
Fuel Exports 0.008*** 0.007 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.008 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.148) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.060) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.241 0.071 0.128 0.156 0.172 0.204 0.227 0.078 0.119 0.148 0.169 0.204 
Fisher  9.38***      8.90***      
Observations  170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism  
             
 Unclear Terrorism  Total Terrorism  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 2.622*** 1.992*** 2.398*** 2.734*** 2.974*** 3.167*** 2.613*** 1.991*** 2.394*** 2.703*** 2.987*** 3.150*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unclear Terrorism   0.016*** 0.025*** 0.019 0.014*** 0.009* 0.006 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.102) (0.007) (0.051) (0.378)       
Total Terrorism --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.004*** 0.005 0.005* 0.003* 0.003** 0.005*** 
       (0.003) (0.164) (0.055) (0.099) (0.048) (0.001) 
Corruption-Control  0.126 0.098 0.168 0.152 0.105 0.111 0.127 0.100 0.176 0.153 0.103 0.114 
 (0.150) (0.724) (0.342) (0.165) (0.308) (0.486) (0.147) (0.698) (0.271) (0.229) (0.411) (0.479) 
Trade Openness 0.002 0.0003 -0.00007 0.0007 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.0003 -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 
 (0.229) (0.964) (0.983) (0.726) (0.156) (0.202) (0.225) (0.963) (0.999) (0.558) (0.257) (0.216) 
Exchange rate(log) -0.044** -0.042 -0.061 -0.035 -0.024 -0.004 -0.041** -0.041 -0.061 -0.034 -0.032 -0.004 
 (0.017) (0.425) (0.159) (0.174) (0.299) (0.825) (0.029) (0.585) (0.121) (0.251) (0.245) (0.818) 
Fuel Exports 0.008*** 0.006 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.007** 0.008*** 0.006 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007** 
 (0.000) (0.130) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.198) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.240 0.082 0.127 0.156 0.180 0.198 0.244 0.071 0.127 0.157 0.177 0.205 
Fisher  13.01***      9.61***      
Observations  170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile 
regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Capital flight  is least. 
 
4.3 Further discussion and policy implications 
  
We have broadly established that terrorism negatively affects capital flight. This finding is 
consistent with the theoretical underpinnings enunciated in the motivation of this line of 
inquiry. Whereas the effect from transnational terrorism is not significant in GMM 
specifications, we have found it to be significant in top quantiles of the QR specifications. 
The direct implication is that the effects based on mean distributions of capital flight are not 
apparent for transnational terrorism. The position of insignificance based on mean 
distributions of capital flight is further confirmed by the insignificance of the transnational 
terrorism estimation in the corresponding OLS model.  
A second fact worth noting from the comparative methodological assessment is that the 
established positive effects from domestic and total terrorism in GMM specifications are 
driven by top quantiles of the capital flight distribution. By implication, the positive effect of 
domestic, transnational and total terrorisms on capital flight are more apparent in countries 
with high levels of capital flight.  
The positive effect of terrorism on capital flight has substantial implications for African 
business and sustainable development, notably: in the need for investment and importance of 
inclusive development in the post-2015 development agenda. Accordingly, there is a growing 
stream of African business literature supporting the need for investment (Rolfe & Woodward, 
2004; Bartels et al., 2009; Asiedu & Lien, 2011; Anyanwu, 2012). According to Asiedu et al. 
(2012), a fundamental factor behind Africa’s underdevelopment is the lack of long term 
investment capital that is essential for sustainable growth. Unfortunately, according to the 
same authors, the continent is characterised by substantial capital flight levels despite being 
capital starved. The April 2015 World Bank publication on Millennium Development Goals 
has recently shown that poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the 
exception of Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2015). In line with recent capital flight 
literature (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012b), concerns about immiserizing growth and capital 
flight are most acute in rich countries of the sub-region; a position that is  consistent with 
recent quality of growth (QG) literature from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(Mlachila et al., 2014, p.27). For example the Republic of Congo and Gabon are among 
Africa’s wealthiest countries with the 15th and 5th ranks and corresponding per capita incomes 
of $1,253 and $4,176. The QG shows deterioration in the positions of these countries (partly 
due to capital flight) between 1990 and 2011. Accordingly, from a comparative assessment of 
93 developing countries in the periods 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2011, the 
rankings of these countries has deteriorated: the Congo Republic (59
th
, 70
th
, 74
th
 and 84
th
) and 
Gabon (58
th
, 61
st
, 67
th
 and 69
th
). 
It is also important to devote space the discussing the policy implications relating to capital 
flight convergence. We notice evidence of catch-up in regressions related to domestic, 
unclear and total terrorisms. Consistent with the capital flight catch-up literature (Asongu, 
2014a), the criterion for evidence of conditional catch-up is when the absolute value of the 
lagged capital flight variable is between zero and one.  The convergence rates are: (i) 9.16% 
(0.275/3) per annum (p.a), 9.20% (0.276/3) p.a and 9.66% (0.290/3) p.a for domestic 
terrorism-related regressions; (ii) 15.83% (0.475/3) p.a for unclear terrorism-oriented 
specifications and (iii) 9.60% (0.288/3) p.a and 11.66% (0.350/3) p.a for total terrorism-
linked estimations
2
.  The corresponding timelines to full catch-up are: (i) 32.75 
(300%/9.16%) years (yrs), 32.60 (300%/9.20%) yrs and 31.05 (300%/9.66%) yrs for 
domestic terrorism-related regressions; (ii) 18.95 (300%/15.83%) yrs for unclear terrorism-
oriented specifications and (iii) 31.25 (300%/9.60%) yrs and 25.72 (300%/11.66%) yrs for 
total terrorism-linked estimations. Evidence of catch-up implies that common policies among 
sampled countries in the fight against capital flight is possible while the presence of full 
catch-up means that the underlying  common policies can be implemented without distinction 
of nationality or locality within sampled countries. The full catch-up period of between 18.95 
and 32.75 years is broadly consistent with the full catch-up variation of between 14.8 and 
33.1 years from Asongu (2014a, p.111). It is interesting to note that the comparison is most 
feasible for the: (i) full sample and (ii) 3 year non-overlapping interval; modelling from the 
corresponding study.  
The harmonization of common policies against capital flight can be enhanced by reducing 
terrorism-related cross-country differences that are inhibiting the convergence process. Some 
documented mechanisms to fighting terrorism have included, inter alia: education (Brockhoff 
et al., 2014), especially in the promotion of bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008); transparency 
(internal and external) (Bell et al., 2014); press freedom and publicity (Hoffman et al., 2013); 
military mechanisms (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010); the assessment of behaviours towards 
terrorism (Gardner, 2007) and respect of the rule of law (Choi, 2010).  
 
5. Conclusion and future directions 
Building on previous literature, we set-out to tackle two main issues notably: (i) the effect of 
terrorism on capital flight and (ii) how this effect varies from one terrorism dynamic to 
another. We have investigated the effects of terrorism on capital flight in a panel 29 African 
countries for which data is available for the period 1987-2008. The terrorism dynamics entail 
domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms. The empirical evidence is based on 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations and Quantile 
regressions (QR). The latter methodology is based on the intuition that blanket policies may 
                                                          
2
 We are dividing the lagged estimated value by 3 because we have used three-year non-overlapping intervals.  
not be effective unless they are contingent on initial capital flight levels and tailored 
differently across high- and low-‘capital flight’ countries. The following findings have been 
established. First, for GMM, domestic, unclear and total terrorisms consistently increase 
capital flight, with the magnitude relatively higher from unclear terrorism. Second, for QR: 
(i) the effect of transnational terrorism is now positively significant in the top quantiles 
(0.75
th
 and 0.90
th
) of the capital flight distribution, (ii) domestic and total terrorisms are also 
significant in the top quantiles and (iii) unclear terrorism is significant in the 0.10
th
 and 0.75
th
 
quantiles.  Policy implications have been discussed. Further research inquiries devoted to 
extending the line of inquiry can focus on country-specific studies.  
 
 
 
References 
Gaibulloev, K., and Sandler, T., (2010), The Adverse Effect of Transnational and Domestic 
Terrorism on Growth in Africa, Journal of Peace Research, 48: 355-372. 
Fearon, J.D., and Laitin, D.D., (2011), Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War, World 
Development, 39(2): 199-211. 
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2002). Greed and grievance in civil war. Working paper series 
2002-01. Centre for the Study of African Economics. Oxford: Oxford University. 
Sharma, K., (2006), The Political Economy of Civil War in Nepal, World Development, 
34(7): 1237-1253. 
Davies, V.A.B., (2010), Capital Flight and Violent Conflict: A Review of the Literature, 
World Development Report 2011 Background Note 
Bellows, J., and Miguel, E., (2009), War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone, 
Journal of Public Economics, 93: 1144-1157. 
Gaibulloev, K., and Sandler, T., (2011), The Adverse Effect of Transnational and Domestic 
Terrorism on Growth in Africa, Journal of Peace Research, 48(3): 355-371 
 
Anyanwu, J., (2012). Why Does Foreign Direct Investment Go Where It Goes?: New 
Evidence From African Countries, Annals of Economics and Finance, 13(2):425-
462. 
Arellano, M., and Bover, O., (1995), Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation 
of Error Component Model. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1): 29-52. 
Asiedu, E., (2006), Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The role of natural resources, 
marketSize, government policy, institutions and political stability. World Economy, 
29(1):63-72. 
Asiedu, E., and Lien, D. (2011). Democracy, foreign direct investment and natural resources. 
Journal of International Economics, 84: 9-111. 
Asiedu, E., Nana, F., and Nti-Addae, A., (2012). “The Paradox of Capital Flight from a 
CapitalStarved Continent”, Department of Economics, University of Kansas, 
Association of Concerned African Scholars, Bulletin No. 87, Fall, 2012. 
http://concernedafricascholars.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/caploss04-asiedu-
14th.pdf   (Accessed: 10/08/2015). 
Asongu, S. A., (2013a, October), Fighting African capital flight: timelines for the adoption of 
common policies’, The Empirical Economics Letters,  
http://www.eel.my100megs.com/volume-12-number-10.htm  (accessed: 09/08/2015). 
Asongu, S. A., (2013b), Fighting corruption in Africa: do existing corruption-control levels 
matter?” International Journal of Development Issues, 12(1): 36-52. 
Asongu, S., (2014a), Fighting African Capital Flight: Empirics on Benchmarking Policy 
Harmonization, The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 11 (1): 93-122. 
Asongu, S. A., (2014b), Financial development dynamic thresholds of financial globalization: 
Evidence from Africa, Journal of Economic Studies, 42(2): 166-195.  
Asongu, S. A., (2014c), The impact of health worker migration on development dynamics: 
evidence of wealth effects from Africa, The European Journal of Health Economics, 
15(2):187-201. 
Asongu, S. A., (2015), Rational Asymmetric Development, Piketty and the Spirit of Poverty 
in Africa”. African Governance and Development Institute Working Paper No. 
15/006, Yaoundé.  
Asongu, S., Efobi, U., and Beecroft, I., (2015), FDI, Aid and Terrorism: Conditional 
Threshold Evidence from Developing Countries, African Governance and 
Development Institute Working Paper Series WP/15/019, Yaoundé.  
Asongu, S. A., and Nwachukwu, J. C., (2015), Revolution empirics: predicting the Arab 
Spring, Empirical Economics: Forthcoming 
Baltagi, B. H., (2008). Forecasting with panel data, Journal of Forecasting, 27(2):153-173.   
Bandyopadhyay, S., and Younas, J., (2014), Terrorism: A Threat to Foreign Direct 
Investment, Doing Business Abroad Policy Report 
Bandyopadhyay, S., Lahiri, S., and Younas, J., (2015), Financing Growth through 
ForeignAid and Private Foreign Loans: Nonlinearities and Complementarities, 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 56, 75-96. doi: 
10.1016/j.jimonfin.2015.04.005. 
Bandyopadhyay, S., Sandler, T., and Younas, J., (2014), Foreign Direct Investment, Aid, 
andTerrorism,Oxford Economic Papers, 66 (1): 25-50. 
Bartels, F. L., Alladina, S.N., and Lederer, S., (2009). Foreign Direct Investment in 
SubSaharanAfrica: Motivating Factors and Policy Issues, Journal of African 
Business, 10(2): 141-162. 
Bell, S. R., Clay, K. C., Murdie, A., and Piazza, J., (2014). “Opening Yourself Up: The Role 
of External and Internal Transparency in Terrorism Attacks”, Political Research 
Quarterly: doi:10.1177/1065912914527798. 
Berrebi, C. and Ostwald, J. (2013), Exploiting the Chaos: Terrorist Target Choice Following 
Natural Disasters, Southern Economic Journal, 79: 793-811. 
Berrebi, C., and Klor, E.F.,(2010), The Impact of Terrorism on the Defence Industry, 
Economica, 77(307): 518-543. 
Berrebi, C., and Ostwald, J., (2014a), Terrorism and the Labour Force: Evidence of an Effect 
on Female Labour Force Participation and the Labour Gender Gap, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 1-29. doi: 10.1177/0022002714535251 
Berrebi, C., and Ostwald, J., (2014b), Terrorism and Fertility: Evidence for a Causal 
Influence of Terrorism on Fertility, Oxford Economic Papers, 1-21. doi: 
10.1093/oep/gpu042. 
Billger, S. M., and Goel, R. K., (2009), Do existing corruption levels matter in controlling 
corruption? Cross-country quantile regression estimates, Journal of Development 
Economics, 90: 299-305.  
Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana, L. (1998), Congo’s odious debt: External borrowing and 
capital flight in Zaire’, Development and Change, 29: 195-217.  
Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana, L. (2001), Is Africa a Net Creditor? New Estimate of Capital 
Flight from Severely Indebted Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1970-1996’, Journal 
of Development,38(2): 27-56. 
Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana L. (2003), ‘Public Debt and Private Assets: Explaining Capital 
Flight from Sub-Saharan African Countries’, World Development, 31(1): 107-130.  
Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana L., (2008), ‘New Estimate of Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan 
African Countries: Linkages with External Borrowing and Policy Option”, PERI 
Working Paper No. 166, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA. 
Boyce, J. K., and  Ndikumana L. (2011), ‘Capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa: linkages 
with external borrowing and policy options’, International Review of Applied 
Economics, 25(2): 149-170. 
Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana L. (2012a), ‘Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan African 
Countries: Updated Estimate, 1970-2010’, Political Economy Research Institute, 
University of Massachusetts. 
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/ADP/SSAfrica_capitalflight_Oct23_2012.pdf  
(accessed: 09/08/2015).  
Boyce, J. K., and  Ndikumana L. (2012b), Rich Presidents of Poor Nations: Capital Flight 
from Resource-Rich Countries in Africa’, Political Economy Research Institute 
University of Massachusetts. http://concernedafricascholars.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/caploss01-ndiku-14th.pdf  (accessed: 09/08/2015). 
Brockhoff, S., Kieger, T., and Meierrieks, D., (2014). “Great Expectations and Hard Times - 
The (Nontrivial) Impact of Education on Domestic Terrorism”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution: doi: 10.1177/0022002713520589.  
Cho., S-W., (2010). Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law?, The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution,  54(6): 940-966. 
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Pattillo, C. (2004), Africa’s Exodus: Capital Flight and the Brain 
Drain as Portfolio Decisions. Journal of African Economies, 13 (2): 15-54. 
Costa., A., Hermandez, M., and Sebastian-Gallés, N., (2008). “Bilingualism aids conflict 
resolution: Evidence from the ANT task”, Cognition, 106 (1): 59-86. 
Davies, V. (2008), Post-war Capital Flight and Inflation. Journal of Peace Research, 45 (4), 
519-537. 
Efobi, U., Asongu, S., and Beecroft, I., (2015), Foreign Direct Investment, Aid and 
Terrorism: Empirical Insight Conditioned on Corruption Control, African 
Governance and Development Institute Working Paper No. 15/007, Yaoundé. 
Efobi, U., Beecroft, I.,  and Asongu, S., (2014), Foreign Aid and Corruption: Clarifying 
Murky Empirical Conclusions, African Governance and Development Institute 
Working Paper No. 14/025, Yaoundé.  
Feridun, M., and Shahbaz, M.,  (2010). Fighting Terrorism: Are Military Measures Effective? 
Empirical Evidence from Turkey, Defence & Peace Economics, 21(2): 193-205.  
Gardner, K. L., (2007). Fighting Terrorism the FATF Way. Global Governance: A Review of 
Multilateralism and International Organisation, 13(3): 325-345. 
Hoffman, A. M., Shelton, C., and Cleven, E., (2013). “Press Freedom, Publicity, and the 
Cross-National Incidence of Transnational Terrorism”, Political Research 
Quarterly, 66 (4): 896-909.  
Koenker, R., and Hallock, F.K., (2001), Quantile regression, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15:143-156. 
Le Roux, S., and Kelsey, D., (2015a), Dragon Slaying with Ambiguity: Theory and 
Experiments”, Sara le Roux, Department of Economics, Oxford Brookes University. 
Le Roux, S., and Kelsey, D., (2015b), Strategic Substitutes, Complements and Ambiguity: 
An Experimental Study, Department of Economics, Oxford Brookes University.  
Love, I., and Zicchino, L., (2006), Financial Development and Dynamic Investment 
Behaviour: Evidence from Panel VAR. The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance, 46(2): 190-210.  
Mlachila, M., Tapsoba, R., and Tapsoba, S. J. A., (2014). A Quality of Growth Index for 
Developing Countries: A Proposal, IMF Working Paper No. 14/172. 
Ndikumana, L. and Boyce, J. K. (2011), Africa’s Odious Debts: How Foreign Loans and 
Capital Flight Bled a Continent. London: Zed Books. 
Ndikumana, L., Boyce, J. K. and Ndiaye, A. S. (2014), Capital Flight from Africa: 
Measurement and Drivers. In S. I. Ajayi and L. Ndikumana (Eds.), Capital Flight 
from Africa: Causes,Effects and Policy Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(Forthcoming). 
Okada, K., and Samreth, S., (2012), The effect of foreign aid on corruption: A quantile 
regression approach, Economic Letters, 115(2): 240-243.  
Piazza, J. A., (2006), Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and 
Social Cleavages, Terrorism and Political Violence,18(1): 159-177. 
Rolfe, R. J., and Woodward, D. P., (2004). Attracting foreign investment through 
privatization: the Zambian experience, Journal of African Business, 5(1): 5-27. 
Roodman, D., (2009a), A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 71(1):135-158.  
Roodman, D., (2009b), How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM 
in Stata, Stata Journal, 9(1): 86-136. 
Weeks, J., (2012), Macroeconomic Impact of Capital Flows in Sub-Saharan African 
Countries, 1980-2008, Association of Concerned Africa Scholar Bulletin, 87., 1-7. 
World Bank (2015). “World Development Indicators’, World Bank Publications 
http://www.gopa.de/fr/news/world-bank-release-world-development-indicators-2015  
(Accessed: 25/04/2015).  
Sandler, T. and Enders, W. (2008) Economic consequences of terrorism in developed and 
developing countries: an overview, in P. Keefer and N. Loayza (eds) Terrorism, 
Economic Development and Political Openness, Cambridge University Press, New 
York. 
 
 
 
 
